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Article 2

THE "IUS GENTIUM" IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
The whole of St. Thomas Aquinas's philosophy of law
rests upon the notion of an absolute, eternal, and wise order
or government within the created Universe, ordained by
God Himself. Everything that exists or moves exists and
moves by this sublime government which directs everything
to its proper end. This government of all things in God and
through the Divine reason has the nature of a law. And since
the Divine reason is not subject to time, but is eternal, the
law by which God governs the Universe must also be eternal.' Hence the eternal government of everything, which
like every Divine concept is true by reason of itself,2 is but
the Divine wisdom and providence directing all actions and
movements.' This is the "lex aeterna" the Divine law of
St. Thomas.' It constitutes the final authority to which man
has to turn "in order ...that (he might) ...know without
any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid." 5
All men, some more, and some less, know of the "lex
aeterna." For God has implanted in the soul of man the
principles of proper action.6 This is man's partaking of the
"lex aeterna" - a participation which is called the "natural
law," 7 and by virtue of which we have within us a knowledge
of certain general principles and precepts of right and justice. 8 No -one can know the "lex aeterna" as it is, in its entirety; but every rational being knows it in its reflection or
1

Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 91, art. 1.
Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 93, art. 1.
3 Summa Theologica, I. II, quaest. 93, art. 1.
4 Compare St. Augustine's definition of the "lex aeterna": "Lex aeterna est
ration Divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari iubens, perturbari
vetans." Contra Faustum, XXII, 27.
5 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest, 91, art. 4.
6 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 91, art. 2.
7 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 90, art. 1; quaest. 91, art. 2; quaest. 94.
8 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 91, art 3; quaest. 90, art 2; quaest 94, art: 1.
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effects.' All laws, insofar as they partake of right reason, are
derived or proceed from the eternal law. For nothing is
just and lawful but what has been drawn from the "lex
aeterna." 10
We remember that St. Thomas Aquinas's basic precept of
his natural moral law is, "that good is to be done and ensued, and evil is to be avoided." " This constitutes the most
self-evident and at the same time indemonstrable proposition; that is to say, the first precept of natural law. 2 "All
other precepts of natural law are based upon this: so that
whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's
good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as
something to be done or avoided." "8From this fundamental
precept are derived "certain most general principles known
to all," '" that is to say, the "primary" natural (moral) law.
These general principles of right and lawful action are discovered by reason. They can never entirely be blotted out
of the hearts of man. 5 Neither could they change,' 6 for they
are valid for all times and places.
Besides the primary precepts, "there belong to the natural
law certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are,
as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles," "7 and which constitute the "secondary" natural
(moral) law. Now we are told that the secondary natural law
is not valid for all times and all places, but does, and must,
change,'" since it is related to matters of concrete human actions. These conclusions from first principles, which form the
secondary natural law, cannot be drawn, however, with absolute certainty. For "the practical reason is concerned with
9 Sunma Theologica, L II., quaest. 91, art. 2; quaest. 93, art. 2.
10 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 93, art. 3.
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Sumrna Theologica,
Summa Theologica,
Summa Theologica,
Summa Theologica,
Summa Theologica,
Sunma Theologica,
Summa Theologica,
Summa Theologica,

I. II., quaest. 94, art. 2.
I. II., quaest. 91, art. 1.
I. II., quaest. 94, art. 2.
I. II., quaest. 94, art. 6; See also ibid. quaest. 91, art. 3.
I. II., quaest. 91, art. 3.
I. 11., quaest. 94, art. 5.
I. II., quaest. 94, art. 6.
I. II., quaest. 94, art. 4; art. 5.
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practical matters which are singular and contingent ...
Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to demonstrated conclusions of science." 11 But the
fact that these conclusions lack inerrancy does in no way
lessen their practical importance. "Nor it is necessary for
every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but
according as it is possible in its own particular genus." 20
The practical human reason, which draws these conclusions,
is concerned with human actions, that is to say, with contingent matters. And "the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects," 21 inasmuch
as "the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions,
but only as regards to the principles which are called common notions." 22 "In matters of action, truth or practical
rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but
only as to the general principles: and where there is the
same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known
to all." 23
St. Thomas Aquinas's justification of the existence and
necessity of a human (positive) law is that "the natural law
was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters . . .which perversion stood in need of correction." 24 In
short, the fall of man perverted human nature, blurred reason, and weakened the will, 25 particularly as to "a particular
action, insofar as reason is hindered from applying the general principle (which can nowise be blotted out from the
hearts of men) to a particular point of practice." 26 It is,
therefore, always the secondary natural law which may be19

Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 91, art. 3; See also ibid. quaest. 94, art. 4.
Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 91, art. 3; See also ibid. quaest. 92, art.
2; and quaest. 94, art. 4.
21 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 4.
20

22
23

Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 4.
Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 4.

24

Surnma Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 5; See also ibid. quaest. 93, art.

6; quaest. 94, art. 4.

25

Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 6; quaest. 93, art. 6; quaest. 94,

art. 4; quaest. 94, art. 5.

26

Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 6.
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come obscured through sin and evil inclination. As to the
essence of the human law, St. Thomas states that, "it is from
the precepts of the natural law, as from general and undemonstrable principles, that the human law needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human
reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential
conditions of law be observed . . ." 27 The basic importance

of the human law lies therein that it enables, so to speak,
disabled persons to follow the dictates of the natural law.28
From all this we may infer that the human law must always
be in complete conformity with the principles of natural
law, and that the power to frame human laws must be derived from the natural law itself:29 "The first rule of reason
is the natural law... , consequently every human law has

just as much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the
natural law." 80 For the human law "is ordained to an end
(the common good),"' and is a rule or measure ruled and
measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is
twofold, viz., the Divine law and the natural law." 2
When St. Thomas Aquinas came to discuss the different
subdivisions of the human (positive) law, his system, that
had up to this point been extremely clear and logical, becomes somewhat indefinite. The amazing thing is that this
was on a part which seemed absolutely unnecessary to his
system of right and justice. His attempt to subdivide and
classify the different aspects of the human law is primarily
an effort to reconcile Aristotle, Gaius, Ulpian, and Isidore
of Sevilla 13 by clinging, however, to the classification laid
27 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 91, art. 3; As to the "essential conditions of the law," see ibid. quaest. 90.
28 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 1.
29 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 93, art. 3; quaest. 95. art. 2.
30 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 2.
31
See, for instance, Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 90, art. 1; art. 3; art
4; quaest. 92, art. 2; quaest. 93, art. 2; quaest. 96, art. 1; art. 3; art. 6.
32 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 3.
33 St. Thomas refers to Isidore and his division or classification of the human
law in: Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 1; art. 2; art. 3; and particularly
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down by Isidore. Gaius and Ulpian had divided law into
(a) "ius naturale," which is that "law which nature has
taught to all living beings;" (b) "ius gentium," which is that
"law which natural reason has set up among men," or that
"law which all peoples make use of;" and (c) the Roman
civil law. 4 The Roman "ius naturale" fully corresponds to
what St. Thomas defines as the natural law, namely (a) as
that law according to which " every substance seeks the
preservation of its being, according to its nature;" (b) as
that law "which nature has taught to all animals, such as
. . . education of offspring and so forth; and (c) as that
"inclination to good, according to the nature of (man's)
reason, which nature is proper to him." " According to the
third definition of the natural (moral) law, by virtue of
which "man has a natural inclination to know the truth
about God, and to live in society,", 3 6 one should expect that
the Roman concept of the "ius gentium" would be classified
by St. Thomas under the natural moral law, particularly under the "secondary" natural law, since both seem essentially
to be the same.
Now in spite of the close affinity of the Roman "ius
gentium" and the natural moral law of St. Thomas, the "ius
gentium" of St. Thomas takes a rather vascillating position
somewhere between the natural law and the human (positive) law. For, as we shall see later, this "ius gentium" is
really of dual origin and, therefore, of dual essence with
St. Thomas. In his "article," "whether the ius gentium is
identical with the ius naturale," 1 St. Thomas declares it
of form of human (positive) law, while in other places he
calls it a form of "secondary" natural law. 8 Then he again
asserts that the positive (human) law is divided into the
in quaest. 95, art. 4 - Isidore drew heavily upon the Fathers from Tertullian on,
and probably on some elementary books of the "Institutes" of Gaius. - See, for
instance, Kuhler, "Isidore Studien," in: Hermes, vol. XXV (1890), pp. 497, 518.
34 See, for instance, Gaius, Institutiones, I, titl. 1.
35 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 2.
36 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 2.
37 Summa Theologica, II. II., quaest. 57, art. 3.
38 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 4.
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"ius gentium" and the "ius civile," 11 and that the "ius
gentium" "falls short of the natural law, as the Jurist says,
because the latter is common to all animals, while the former
is common to man only." 4 But soon he remembers again the
proximity of his own natural (moral) law and the Roman
definition of the "ius gentium," of the "law which all peoples
make use of." "' Thus- he is induced to incorporate the "ius
gentium" in his natural law, or to be more exact, in his
"secondary" natural law.
As to the origin of the "ius gentium," St. Thomas Aquinas,
on the one hand, asserts that it is grounded, quite in accordance with its "positivistic" nature, in certain historically
existing conditions, in the mutual agreement among men,
in human consent, or in a common determination caused by
a certain necessity or by the utility or idea of the common
good to be fostered thereby.42 On the other hand, he again
declares it to have originated, like the "secondary" natural
law, from logical conclusions from first principles,43 thus including the "ius gentium" in his natural law. In the latter
sense this "ius gentium" partakes of the absolute essence of
the natural law, insofar as its first principles are to be found,
in the last analysis, in the eternal law.44
Undoubtedly, the "ius gentium" of St. Thomas Aquinas
is of dual essence. Its more immediate origin and the cause
of its existence or validity is to be looked for in a rather
hypothetical common human agreement and custom. However, since it also partakes of the moral absoluteness of the
natural law, and, in the last analysis, of the eternal law, its
ultimate grounds are to be found in the "lex naturalis" and,
therefore, in the "lex aeterna."
30

Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 4.
Summa Theologica, II, II, quaest. 57, art. 3.
41 Compare St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 94, art. 6:
".. there belong to the natural law . . . certain most general precepts, that are
known to all."
42 See, for instance, Summa Theologica, II. II., quaest. 57, art. 3.
43 Summa Theologica, I. H., quaest. 95, art. 2.
44 Summa Theologica, I. II., quaest. 95, art. 4.
40
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The basic problems of the "ius gentium" of St. Thomas
Aquinas are the questions of private property and slavery.
St. Thomas insists that originally a universal community of
all property or possession " as well as the c6mplete freedom
of all men prevailed.4 6 In compliance with a general custom
existing among the peoples the institutions of private property and slavery made their appearance. In order to reconcile these new institutions with the precepts of natural law,
St. Thomas maintains that they form part of the "secondary"
natural law, since both are not only beneficial to the human
race, but also were introduced for their necessity and utility
in achieving the common good,"7 in spite of the fact that the
"primary" natural law proclaims the community of all property as well as the freedom of all men. Originally neither private property nor slavery were part of the natural law. Man
was at liberty, however, to introduce both as soon as their
necessity and utility for the common good was perceived.
But once introduced, these two "secondary" natural law principles must be observed with the same consistency as every
"primary" natural law precept. It cannot be denied that this
rather vascillating position of St. Thomas as regards the
"ius gentium" is, from a practical point of view, of the most
far-reaching social and political consequences. For it furnishes an excellent argument not only against the excesses
of a capitalistic economy by referring to the original or "natural" community of all property, but also against any form
of communism by pointing out that the institution of private property rests upon the sanctity of an irrevocable agreement among men.
Anton-Hermann Chroust.
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.
45 See, for instance, Summa Theologica, I, quaest. 98, art. 1; II. II., quaeat.
66, art. 1; art. 2.
46
Summa Theologica, H. U., quaest. 57, art 3.
47 Summa Theologica, II. II., quaest. 57, art. 3.

